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 The Hong Kong government has recently enacted legislation 
granting tax benefits for R&D expenses to boost investment in R&D 
in Hong Kong. This Article analyzes what would be the optimal 
design of R&D incentives in Hong Kong, and concludes that the 
new tax benefits for R&D are unlikely to increase R&D investment 
in Hong Kong in the most cost-effective manner. The Hong Kong 
government should consider replacing these tax benefits with other, 
more effective R&D subsidies. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 42 
I.     BACKGROUND, SUBSIDIES AND TAX BENEFITS ........................ 46 
II.   DESIGNING R&D TAX BENEFITS .............................................. 49 
A. General Principles .............................................................. 49 
B. Should R&D Subsidies Be Structured as Tax Benefits? ..... 50 
C. Evaluation of R&D Tax Benefits in Hong Kong ................ 56 
D. Alternative Policies ............................................................ 61 
III.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................... 62 
 
  
                                                                                                               
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
42 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong’s high-tech sector has been lagging behind other 
countries and major cities in the region, such as Singapore and 
Shenzhen.1  Unlike many countries that provide R&D tax benefits, 
Hong Kong did not provide such incentives until recently.  Are 
R&D tax benefits the panacea that will boost the development of 
Hong Kong’s high-tech sector?  This is the view of the Hong Kong 
government that recently enacted legislation granting a super 
deduction for R&D expenses.2  Providing tax benefits is supported 
by a few commentators3 and organizations.4 
Contrary to this view, this Article contends that these R&D 
tax benefits are unlikely to increase R&D investment in Hong Kong 
in the most cost-effective manner.  Instead of providing tax benefits 
that are described as a “budget Trojan horse” by some tax policy 
scholars,5 the Hong Kong government should consider replacing the 
tax benefits with other, more effective R&D subsidies. 
In general, designing optimal R&D subsidies (including tax 
benefits for R&D) requires two stages:6 In the first stage, the 
characteristics of the optimal R&D subsidy should be determined, 
irrespective of whether the subsidy is granted through the tax 
system, given as a cash subsidy, or provided through other 
                                                                                                               
 1 See Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017, WORLD ECON. 
F., at 16, 27 (stating that Hong Kong remains “far behind the world’s innovation 
powerhouses” and that “[t]he challenge for Hong Kong is to evolve from one of the 
world’s foremost financial hubs to become an innovative powerhouse: with the exception 
of the market size pillar (33rd), innovation remains the weakest aspect (27th) of Hong 
Kong’s performance and the business community consistently cites the capacity to 
innovate as their biggest concern;” and that Singapore is ranked 9th in the world and 2nd in 
Asia, after Japan in the innovation pillar in this report); Shenzhen Is A Hothouse of 
Innovation: Copycats are Out, Innovators are In, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2017). 
 2 Inland Revenue (Amendment) (No. 7) Ordinance 2018. The term “super deduction” 
(which is referred to as “enhanced deduction” in this legislation) means that a deduction 
greater than 100% (for example, 200% or 300%) of the expense is granted for a certain 
qualifying expense. 
 3 Jingyi Wang, Hong Kong Losing Out in Powering Innovation: The Necessity of 
Introducing New Research and Development Tax Incentives in Hong Kong, 47 HONG 
KONG L. J. 143 (2017). 
 4 Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Policy and Budget 
Proposals 2016-17 (2016) and Tax Policy and Budget Proposals 2017-18 (2017). 
 5 Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, R&D Tax Incentives: 
Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419 (2016). 
 6 Noam Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research & 
Development Tax Benefits, 34 VA. TAX REV. 109, 143 (2014). 
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mechanisms.7  In the second stage, institutional design 
considerations should be evaluated to determine whether the 
subsidy should be provided through the tax system.8  A tax subsidy 
is, in substance, a spending program administered through the tax 
system.9  It is generally possible to structure a spending program 
(for example, a grant program) that would be economically 
equivalent to a tax benefits program and vice versa.10  Thus, the 
decision whether benefits should be granted as tax benefits or as 
cash subsidies largely depends on institutional design 
considerations: which government agency would be the best choice 
for administering the program?11 
The evaluation and design of tax benefits for R&D should be 
done as part of a broader evaluation of possible government policies 
to support the development of the high-tech sector in Hong Kong.  
This evaluation should include cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analyses for each of the subsidies to ensure that the alternative 
policies are assessed under the same methodology, and that the best 
policies are adopted.  This process should also ensure that the 
policies are coordinated so that there is no unintended “double 
dipping” or other inefficiencies as a result of uncoordinated policies 
designed and administered by separate governmental bodies.  This 
Article recommends that the evaluation and design of all R&D-
related policies, including R&D tax benefits, should be integrated 
under one governmental office, and not divided between separate 
parts of the government based on the type of the instrument. 
                                                                                                               
 7 Id. 
 8 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). 
 9 This is the main conclusion of the extensive literature on tax expenditures. See infra 
note 39. 
 10 Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36, VA. 
TAX REV. 25 (2017). For example, it is possible to design as economically equivalent a 
cash subsidy with a matching requirement and a refundable tax credit. It is possible to 
create a subsidy economically equivalent to a non-refundable tax credit or a super 
deduction by limiting the maximum annual subsidy to the annual tax liability of the 
relevant recipient. However, there may be differences between certain commonly used 
subsidies and tax benefits, so the effect of those instruments might not be identical. This is 
further discussed in section C below. 
 11 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8. Both subsidies and economically-equivalent 
R&D tax benefits must be compliant with the rules of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Therefore, the choice of instrument should not make a difference when assessed 
by the WTO. 
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There are serious doubts about whether a super deduction 
would be the most cost-effective measure for increasing R&D 
investment in Hong Kong.  A super deduction favors companies 
with taxable income in Hong Kong, and disfavors foreign 
companies that do not have a substantial taxable income in Hong 
Kong that could be offset by the deduction, as well as start-up 
companies that typically generate losses in their early stages.  Thus, 
the new super deduction is unlikely either to attract substantial 
foreign investment in domestic R&D or to boost the growth of start-
ups in Hong Kong.  In addition, the empirical evidence in the 
economic literature on the impact of the super deductions and tax 
credits for R&D expenses raises doubts as to whether these 
subsidies are cost-effective.12  It is questionable whether one dollar 
of foregone tax revenue on R&D super deduction and tax credit will 
raise expenditure on R&D by more than one dollar.13 
Providing an economically-equivalent cash subsidy through 
a specialized agency would likely be more efficient than providing a 
tax subsidy—such as a super deduction—through the tax system.14  
In recent publications, tax policy scholars have argued that the tax 
authority is largely not suited to designing and implementing R&D-
inducing mechanisms, and that R&D-inducing tax incentives should 
be generally repealed and replaced by cash transfer programs.15  
These cash subsidies are typically managed by specialized 
government agencies. A specialized agency such as Hong Kong’s 
Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF) has more relevant expertise 
than Hong Kong’s tax authority, the Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD).  For example, the ITF can better assess which expenses 
qualify as R&D expenses.  As the ITF already administers several 
                                                                                                               
 12 See text accompanying infra note 72. 
 13 See, e.g., CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, A Study on R&D 
Tax Incentives 5 (The European Comm’n, Working Paper No. 52) (stating that “Studies 
that are more rigorous find that one euro of foregone tax revenue on R&D tax credits raises 
expenditure on R&D by less than one euro.”). 
 14 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10. 
 15 See Shay et al., supra note 5, at 455 (proposing repealing R&D tax incentives and 
shifting “revenue savings to direct expenditures for peer-reviewed R&D proposals oriented 
toward basic R&D and risky development R&D”); Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10, at 30 
(stating that “[t]he general conclusion is that public tasks of fostering innovation should not 
be allocated to the tax agency. The tax authority is largely not suited for designing and 
implementing innovation-inducing mechanisms. Innovation-inducing tax incentives should 
be generally repealed and replaced by cash transfer programs, managed by government 
agencies that specialize by subject-matter.”) 
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subsidy schemes, administering an additional R&D subsidy 
program by the IRD would likely result in larger coordination costs.  
Even if a tax subsidy is too expensive or ineffective, it would be 
difficult to amend or repeal it because it is provided through 
legislation, whereas there may be more flexibility built into a 
subsidy designed and administered by a specialized agency.  There 
is typically a greater ability to manage a cash subsidy within a 
budget, whereas a tax benefit is an open-ended benefit that is 
typically not subject to a budget constraint. 
In addition, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have reasons 
to prefer non-tax subsidies over tax benefits because of the 
international tax reforms under the OECD’s project on base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS).16  These international tax reforms 
increase the risk that other countries will tax the income of MNEs if 
such income is exempted from tax in Hong Kong.17  Therefore, 
Hong Kong is likely to attract more MNE investment in R&D if it 
replaces its tax subsidy (the new super deduction) with an 
economically-equivalent cash subsidy. 
This Article proposes that instead of foregoing tax revenues 
to fund a super deduction, the government should use these 
resources to fund other, more cost-effective subsidies.18  While 
structuring a cash subsidy economically equivalent to a super 
deduction or tax credit would likely be superior to providing these 
benefits through the tax system, other subsidies might be more 
successful in boosting the development of Hong Kong’s high-tech 
sector.  Subsidies that target investment in human capital, especially 
that of inexperienced employees, are likely to generate positive 
spillovers by improving the local talent pool.19  Providing benefit 
packages to selected MNEs in exchange for their commitment to 
employing a certain number of local R&D workers can have a 
substantial impact on the domestic high-tech sector because these 
MNEs can train a high number of local employees and contribute to 
the development of a specialized hub.  In addition, the Hong Kong 
                                                                                                               
 16 Noam Noked, From Tax Competition to Subsidy Competition (working paper, 
2018). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Shay et al., supra note 5, at 455, for a similar proposal regarding R&D tax 
credits in the United States. 
 19 Noked, supra note 6, at 145. 
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government should consider improving and possibly expanding the 
existing cash subsidy schemes. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the 
subsidy schemes tax benefits for R&D in Hong Kong, part II 
evaluates these policies, and part III concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND, SUBSIDIES AND TAX BENEFITS 
Why should the Hong Kong government, or any other 
government, provide any economic benefit for R&D?  In general, 
countries compete to attract R&D activities because of the domestic 
spillovers that they generate.20  The economic literature shows that 
R&D activities have a significant influence on employment, human 
capital, productivity, and economic growth.21  Investment in R&D 
can generate significant positive spillovers from developing a pool 
of experienced tech professionals in Hong Kong, who contribute to 
the economy by holding high-paying jobs, launching start-ups, and 
by attracting MNEs to invest in high-tech companies and R&D 
centers in Hong Kong.  These effects could increase Hong Kong’s 
GDP, similar to other countries with a thriving high-tech sector such 
as Ireland and Israel.  Over time, if efforts to boost investment in the 
high-tech sector are successful, it is expected that the private sector 
investment in R&D will increase and the need for government 
support will decrease. 
The Hong Kong government has been providing support for 
R&D through non-tax measures by investing in infrastructure, 
universities, and funding programs for R&D.22  Hong Kong has 
expanded its spending on R&D in recent years.23  The ITF, a Hong 
                                                                                                               
 20 Shay et al., supra note 5, at 440-41. 
 21 Noked, supra note 6, at 115. 
 22 Wang, supra note 3, at 148-50. 
 23 Gregory So, LCQ9: Competitiveness of Hong Kong (Nov. 9, 2016),  
http://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/en/Legco_Business/Replies_to_Legco_Questions/2016/P201
6110900296.html [https://perma.cc/RN98-SDHU] (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (“Following 
the establishment of the Innovation and Technology Bureau in November last year, the 
government has invested over $18 billion to formulate a series of initiatives with a view to 
fostering I&T development in Hong Kong in multiple aspects, including increasing basic 
infrastructure for research and development (R&D); funding universities in conducting 
midstream research and commercialising R&D results; promoting ‘re-industrialisation’; 
subsidising the industry’s adoption of technology to upgrade and transform; supporting 
start-up developments; nurturing R&D talents; and funding projects that make use of I&T 
in improving the people’s daily living.”). 
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Kong government fund, administers eight separate subsidy 
programs, some of which are for private companies, some for 
universities, and one is for collaborations between universities and 
private companies.24 
The largest R&D cash subsidy program for private 
companies’ R&D expenses is the Enterprise Support Scheme (ESS), 
which provides up to HK$10 million (approximately US$1.28 
million) to approved projects on a dollar-for-dollar matching basis.25  
A company that receives this subsidy can also apply for the 
Research and Development Cash Rebate Scheme to receive a cash 
rebate of up to 40% of certain expenses.26  Under the requirements 
of the ESS, the applicant needs to be a Hong Kong incorporated 
company, the project period should not be longer than two years, 
and the company should own all IP rights arising from the project.27  
The government’s contribution is not recouped, and benefit sharing 
of commercialized R&D results is non-mandatory, although the ITF 
may favor proposals that include benefit sharing with the 
government.28  It is unclear how accessible the ESS is for start-ups 
and small companies with limited resources.29  Cyberport, an 
incubator that is wholly owned by the Hong Kong government, also 
provides financial support to high-tech companies.  It offers various 
                                                                                                               
 24 For information about these programs, see ITF, http://www.itf.gov.hk/l-
eng/about.asp [https://perma.cc/6QTD-JWFZ] (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (listing the ITF 
subsidy programs, among which Enterprise Support Scheme, Research and Development 
Cash Rebate Scheme, and Technology Voucher Programme are for private companies; 
Technology Start-up Support Scheme for Universities, Midstream Research Programme 
for Universities, Innovation and Technology Support Programme, and Guangdong-Hong 
Kong Technology Cooperation Funding Scheme are for universities. The University-
Industry Collaboration Programme is for collaborations between universities and private 
companies). 
 25 ITF, http://www.itf.gov.hk/l-eng/ESS.asp [https://perma.cc/HA26-TQLE] (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018) (providing more information about Enterprise Support Scheme). 
 26 Id. This means that the effective matching ratio is more generous than 1:1. 
 27 Id. 
 28 ITF, https://www.itf.gov.hk/l-eng/ESS_FAQ.asp#7 [https://perma.cc/EDV9-
TW6X] (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (“Benefit-sharing will be considered together with 
other components under Relevance with Government Policies or in Overall Interest of the 
Community, the total weighting of which is 10%.”). 
 29 Another program administered by the ITF, the Technology Voucher Program, 
offers small to medium private companies up to HKD 200,000 for projects that aim to 
improve productivity through technological solutions. In the light of the low amount 
offered and the onerous application process, it is unclear how accessible and effective this 
subsidy is, and whether the companies that have the resources to apply for this subsidy 
really need government support. 
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subsidies and financial support to selected companies.30  It also 
provides co-working space for local start-ups and foreign 
companies.31 
Until recently, Hong Kong did not provide any tax benefits 
for R&D activities.  Proposals to adopt a super deduction or a tax 
credit for R&D in Hong Kong have been floated for the last few 
years.  For example, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants expressed its support for super deductions of 150% in 
its comments on the 2016-17 budget and the 2017-18 budget.32  
Similarly, Wang argued that it is necessary for Hong Kong to adopt 
R&D tax benefits.33 
Mrs. Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, proposed a 
super tax deduction for R&D activities as a way to boost R&D 
activities in Hong Kong.34  Following the Chief Executive’s 
proposal, the Hong Kong government has recently enacted 
legislation granting a super deduction of 300% for the first HK$2 
million and 200% for the remainder of the amount of R&D 
expenditures that meet certain conditions.35  This new tax benefit 
                                                                                                               
 30 Cyberport, http://www.cyberport.hk/en [https://perma.cc/WJ2M-3AA7] (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, supra note 4. 
 33 Wang, supra note 3 at 166-167. Wang recommended considering a super deduction 
of 150-200% for qualifying R&D expenditure, and possibly an additional volume-based 
tax credit that may be refundable. 
 34 Joyce Ng, New City Leader Carrie Lam Puts Tax Reform at the Top of Her 
Agenda, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 28, 2017, 11:52 PM),  
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/economy/article/2082903/new-hong-kong-leader-
carrie-lam-puts-tax-reform-top-her [https://perma.cc/MR5X-QMYQ]. Mrs. Lam’s election 
manifesto stated the following: “At present, the research and development (R&D) 
expenditure in Hong Kong only accounts for 0.74% of our GDP, which is far lower than 
our neighbouring countries and places such as Singapore (2%), Taiwan (3%), Shenzhen 
(4%) and South Korea (4%). In fact, 56% of our R&D spending comes from the public 
purse. Hong Kong needs to propel its economy with innovation. For that we have to 
introduce additional tax deductions to encourage R&D. The spending of enterprises on 
R&D will enjoy tax deductions that are higher than the relevant amounts actually spent, 
such as 200%. Additional tax deductions may also apply to spending on environmental 
protection initiatives, culture, arts and design so as to promote the development of these 
industries.” See Carrie Lam, Connecting for Consensus and A Better Future, Manifesto of 
Carrie Lam, Chief Executive Election 2017 (Feb. 27, 2017), §§ 3.50 & 3.51,  
https://www.ceo.gov.hk/eng/pdf/Manifesto_words_E_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5AS-
PWMV]. 
 35 The Inland Revenue (Amendment) (No. 7) Amendment 2018, supra note 2. This 
amendment was gazetted in November 2018. 
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will be granted in addition to (and not as a substitute for) the 
existing R&D subsidy programs. 
II. DESIGNING R&D TAX BENEFITS 
A. General Principles 
Designing the optimal R&D tax benefits requires two 
stages.36  In the first stage, the characteristics of the optimal R&D 
subsidy should be determined, irrespective of whether the subsidy is 
granted through the tax system, given as a cash subsidy, or provided 
through other mechanisms such as allocation of legal rights. Various 
questions should be considered in designing the optimal subsidy.37  
In the second stage, institutional design considerations should be 
evaluated to determine whether granting the subsidy should be 
provided through the tax system or through other subsidy 
schemes.38  In general, a tax subsidy is, in substance, a spending 
program administered through the tax system.39  It is generally 
possible to structure a spending program (for example, cash grant 
program) that would be economically equivalent to a tax benefits 
program and vice versa.40  Therefore, whether the subsidy should be 
granted as a tax benefit or as a cash grant largely depends on the 
government agency that would be the best choice for administering 
the program.41 
                                                                                                               
 36 Noked, supra note 6, at 143. 
 37 As discussed in detail in Noked, supra note 6, at 143, these questions include, 
among others, the following questions: “What kinds of activities and investments should 
the subsidy promote? Should the subsidy be granted only to successful R&D? What would 
be the optimal timing for granting the subsidy? Should the subsidy treat mobile and 
immobile capital differently? Should different incentives be granted to MNEs and smaller 
domestic firms?” These considerations are discussed in section C below. 
 38 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8. 
 39 This is the main conclusion of the extensive literature on tax expenditures. See, for 
example, Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) 
and the subsequent literature. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, United States 
Congress, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016-2020 (Jan. 30, 
2017) (“Special income tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they may 
be analogous to direct outlay programs and may be considered alternative means of 
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives. Tax expenditures are similar to direct 
spending programs that function as entitlements to those who meet the established 
statutory criteria.”). 
 40 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10. This is further discussed in section C below. 
 41 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8. 
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As tax benefits for R&D are only a part of a broader set of 
possible alternatives for government support for R&D, the tax 
benefits for R&D should be designed and evaluated as part of a 
broader evaluation of the alternative R&D-related policies.  As the 
fiscal resources that the Hong Kong government can provide to the 
high-tech industry are limited, the Hong Kong government should 
conduct cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses for each 
subsidy, including tax benefits.42  As part of these analyses, all 
subsidies, including tax benefits, should be evaluated and compared.  
This will ensure that the alternative policies are assessed under the 
same methodology and that the most cost-effective policies are 
adopted.  It will also ensure that the chosen policies are coordinated, 
so that there is no unintended “double dipping”43 or other 
inefficiencies because of uncoordinated policies designed and 
administered by separate governmental bodies. 
Under the organizational structure of the Hong Kong 
government, the ITB leads the overall policy setting with respect to 
R&D in Hong Kong,44 whereas the FSTB develops the tax-related 
policies.  This Article recommends that the evaluation and design of 
all R&D-related policies should be integrated, and not divided 
between separate parts of the government based on the choice of 
instrument. 
B. Should R&D Subsidies Be Structured as Tax Benefits? 
A key question is whether an R&D subsidy—whatever its 
characteristics may be—should be structured as a tax benefit 
administered by the IRD or as a cash subsidy administered by a 
                                                                                                               
 42 In general, according to Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 124 YALE L.J. F. 263, 264 (2015), a cost-benefit analysis involves “an effort (1) 
to quantify the anticipated consequences of regulatory action and (2) to monetize those 
consequences in terms of benefits and costs, subject to (3) a feasibility constraint, meant to 
acknowledge that some consequences may be hard or impossible either to quantify or 
monetize.” A cost-effectiveness analysis involves comparing alternative regulatory actions 
with the same desired outcome. See Circular A-4, United States Office of Management and 
Budget 10-11 (Sept. 17, 2003) for a detailed discussion. 
 43 This means a situation where a company receives multiple subsidies. Of course, it 
is possible that the government intends that companies will be able to receive multiple 
subsidies. “Double dipping” is problematic where the government did not intend that 
companies will receive multiple subsidies, and it results in a subsidy too high. 
 44 ITB, https://www.itb.gov.hk/en/about_us/role.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/HF24-TSC4] for the goals of the ITB. 
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specialized agency (e.g., the ITF).  The answer largely depends on 
the government agency that would be administering the program.45  
In recent publications, tax policy scholars have argued that the tax 
authority is largely not suited to designing and implementing R&D-
inducing mechanisms, and that R&D-inducing tax incentives should 
generally be repealed and replaced by cash transfer programs, 
managed by specialized government agencies.46  This section 
discusses the reasons why a specialized government agency would 
be superior to the IRD in administering a subsidy program for R&D. 
According to Nussim and Weisbach, the institutional design 
considerations include specialization (i.e., which agency has the 
expertise required for administering the relevant activities?) and 
coordination (among the activities of the preferred agency, and the 
activities of other agencies).47  In addition to specialization and 
coordination, this Article discusses three additional relevant 
considerations: (i) institutional flexibility and the ability to make 
changes in the design of the subsidy; (ii) institutional ability to 
operate within a budget; and (iii) compliance and administrative 
costs. 
Specialization.  There is no complementarity between R&D-
inducing programs and the IRD’s activities and capabilities.48  The 
IRD has expertise in assessing taxable income; it does not have any 
scientific and technological expertise in R&D.  This lack of 
expertise is more problematic in situations where the agency 
administering the benefits program should exercise discretion that 
requires expertise.  It is possible to staff the IRD with experts who 
have the relevant expertise or to liaise with experts from other 
governmental departments,49 but it is unclear why the IRD should 
                                                                                                               
 45 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8. 
 46 Shay et al., supra note 5, at 455, (suggesting repealing R&D tax incentives and 
shifting “revenue savings to direct expenditures for peer-reviewed R&D proposals oriented 
toward basic R&D and risky development R&D”); Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10, at 30 
(stating that “[t]he general conclusion is that public tasks of fostering innovation should not 
be allocated to the tax agency. The tax authority is largely not suited for designing and 
implementing innovation-inducing mechanisms. Innovation-inducing tax incentives should 
be generally repealed and replaced by cash transfer programs, managed by government 
agencies that specialize by subject-matter.”). 
 47 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 983-996. 
 48 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10, at 76-77. 
 49 The recent legislative amendment, supra note 2, authorizes the IRD to consult with 
the Commissioner for Innovation and Technology in determining whether R&D 
expenditures qualify for the enhanced deduction. 
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be preferred over a specialized agency.  If the tax authority does not 
have experts who can exercise such discretion, and the subsidy must 
be administered through the tax system, this would likely confine 
the possible subsidies to nondiscretionary or minimally-
discretionary subsidies, such as a super deduction or a tax credit for 
R&D expenses.50  This would be suboptimal if the optimal subsidy 
involves exercising discretion.51  Moreover, even nondiscretionary 
subsidies, such as super deductions and tax credits, could be better 
handled by a specialized agency than the IRD.  International 
experience shows that where an R&D tax benefit is offered, many 
companies have re-labeled various expenses as R&D expenses to 
claim the tax benefit.52  A specialized agency will likely be more 
accurate and cost-efficient than the IRD in determining the claims 
that are for real R&D expenses and that should be subsidized, and 
the ones that should not qualify for the subsidy.  The IRD has more 
expertise in detecting other types of fraud (for example, falsified 
expenses that have never been incurred) through tax audits, 
although the IRD conducts these audits for tax purposes irrespective 
of the agency that administers the R&D subsidies. 
Coordination.  In general, where there are R&D-inducing 
schemes both inside and outside the tax system, there are 
coordination challenges and costs from coordinating tax incentives 
and cash transfers for R&D.53  The Hong Kong government already 
provides subsidies such as the schemes administered by ITF and 
Cyberport.  If tax benefits are offered in addition to these subsidy 
schemes, there should be coordination between the IRD and the 
relevant government agencies.  Coordination is required as part of 
the design stage to ensure that the intended benefits are provided, 
and to prevent “double dipping” where participants receive more 
                                                                                                               
 50 Id. 
 51 See, e.g., Shay et al., supra note 5, at 426 (arguing that discretionary incentive 
programs are likely more efficient than open-ended programs). 
 52 See, e.g., Chen et al., Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts 
in China (NBER Working Paper No. 24749),  
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24749 [https://perma.cc/CV5W-WHFM], and other studies 
cited there. In this study of an R&D tax benefits program in China, the authors found 
evidence that up to 45% of the reported increase in R&D was due to the re-labeling of 
administrative expenses. The companies in this program were pre-approved by this 
selective program after they met certain criteria, which include conducting R&D. The 
magnitude of re-labeling could have been much higher if the tax benefits were offered to 
companies on a non-selective basis. 
 53 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10, at 76. 
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benefits than intended by the government.  Coordination may also 
be required in the administration of the various programs, 
depending on the specific rules of each one.54  If all the benefits 
were designed and administered through one specialized agency 
(e.g., the ITF), then the coordination of the programs would be more 
efficient and less costly. 
Flexibility and the ability to make changes.  Making changes 
in a subsidy scheme designed and administered through a 
specialized agency is likely to be easier than making changes in 
benefits that are provided under legislation, such as tax legislation.  
The experience of the United States with its R&D tax credit is an 
example of tax benefits that are unlikely to change, mostly due to 
political considerations.55  As there is a risk that R&D benefits 
might be found to be ineffective or too costly, the ability to make 
changes is especially important.  Investors may be more willing to 
rely on a “stickier” program that is harder to change or repeal, 
although it is possible to provide certain protections and guarantees 
to participants in programs administered by a specialized agency.56  
Another reason to support flexibility is identified by Shay, Fleming, 
and Peroni, who argue that weaknesses in specifying the objective 
for an innovation incentive should bias the choice of instrument 
toward an individualized government-set incentive incorporating 
peer review, that is directed at both basic R&D, and R&D that is 
subject to experimental risk.57 
Ability to operate within a budget.  A subsidy administered 
by a specialized agency typically has a fixed budget, and there are 
limits to the agency’s ability to obtain additional funding beyond the 
allocated budget.  To be able to operate within a budget, a 
specialized agency typically has the discretion to manage its 
spending so that it spends the allocated budget only.  The IRD, 
when it administers tax benefits provided under the tax law on an 
                                                                                                               
 54 For example, if a company that receives a cash subsidy is not eligible for a 
particular tax benefit, then the IRD and the relevant specialized agency needs to cooperate 
in order to ensure compliance with this requirement. 
 55 For a discussion on the political issues concerning R&D tax credits, see Shay et al., 
supra note 5, at 420-421 (“The political popularity of supporting R&D tax incentives 
within the Washington, D.C. ‘Beltway’ is the tax equivalent of embracing motherhood and 
apple pie”). 
 56 For example, the government can be contractually bound to provide a certain 
subsidy to a company under a contract between the government and that company. 
 57 Shay et al., supra note 5, at 426. 
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open-ended basis, does not have the discretion to reduce tax benefits 
if the total cost of these tax benefits exceeds a certain threshold.  
Therefore, it is harder to control the rising costs of a tax subsidy 
program than those of a direct spending program.58  In theory, it is 
possible to structure a budget constraint into a tax benefit, so that 
there will be a mechanism that will provide for certain adjustments 
to the tax benefits, ensuring that the total expenditure does not 
exceed the allocated budget.  However, the reality of enacting such 
a mechanism may not be feasible, and structuring the subsidy as a 
tax benefit might confine the feasible design options to an open-
ended benefit that is harder to manage fiscally. 
Compliance and Administrative Costs.  Assume that the 
Hong Kong government decides to introduce a nondiscretionary 
subsidy for R&D expenses.  Would it lower the compliance and the 
administrative costs if this benefit were administered as a cash 
subsidy by a specialized agency (e.g., the ITF) or as a refundable tax 
credit by the IRD?  The main compliance cost for companies 
claiming this benefit is the cost of preparing and filing the form 
claiming the R&D subsidy.  This cost appears to be similar 
irrespective of whether the subsidy is administered by a specialized 
agency or the IRD.59  The IRD or the specialized agency should 
review the form and confirm that the expenses are real R&D 
expenses that qualify for the benefit.  As discussed above, a 
specialized agency is likely to be more accurate and cost-effective 
in determining which claimed expense is a real R&D expense.  The 
IRD already has a mechanism of providing tax refunds to taxpayers 
that have overpaid their taxes.  Creating a payment system for a 
specialized agency would likely result in higher costs.  As an 
alternative, the specialized agency could utilize the IRD’s payment 
mechanism for this purpose.  In any case, in a jurisdiction with a 
world-class financial system such as Hong Kong, the cost of 
processing periodic payments to the eligible companies should not 
be high.  Thus, it is unclear whether the compliance and 
administrative costs would be substantially different if a subsidy 
were administered by the IRD or by a specialized agency. 
                                                                                                               
 58 This is one of the critiques raised in the tax expenditure literature. See text 
accompanying supra note 39. 
 59 It does not appear to make a difference if this filing is done as part of the relevant 
company’s tax return or in another form that is filed with the specialized agency. 
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Wang’s argument in support of tax benefits for R&D 
assumes that cash subsidy programs have a relatively narrow target 
whereas tax benefits can be made more widely available.60  
Although this is an accurate description of some subsidy programs 
and tax benefits, this cannot be accepted as a general assumption 
regarding the possible instrument design options.  Following 
Nussim and Sorek, it is generally possible to structure a spending 
program that would be economically equivalent to a tax benefits 
program and vice versa.61  There is no reason why a specialized 
agency cannot administer a widely-available cash R&D subsidy.62  
Wang, citing another commentator, notes that grant programs 
“usually suffer from a higher degree of bureaucratic discretion and 
are less effective in encouraging long-term research because the 
availability of grants depends on the adequacy of relevant funding, 
and grant allocation often operates on a yearly cycle.”63  This 
descriptive observation regarding the bureaucratic discretion of 
some existing subsidies does not reflect a necessary design feature 
of a subsidy administered by a specialized agency; such an agency 
can administer a nondiscretionary benefits program with little 
bureaucracy.  Regarding the availability of funding, as discussed 
above, it is unclear whether the benefits from investors’ greater 
reliance on a tax benefit exceed the social cost from a lower ability 
to make changes in the subsidy and to operate within a budget. 
In summary, from an institutional design perspective, a 
specialized agency appears to be superior to the IRD in designing 
and administering R&D incentives.  The advantage of a specialized 
agency is larger where the subsidy involves more discretionary 
elements.  Even where the subsidy is nondiscretionary, 
administering it via a specialized agency still has the advantages of 
expertise (e.g., the expertise to determine which claimed expenses 
are real R&D expenses), lower coordination costs, more flexibility 
to make changes in the subsidy, and greater ability to operate within 
a budget. 
                                                                                                               
 60 Wang, supra note 3, at 150, 167. 
 61 Nussim & Sorek, supra note 10, at 58. 
 62 For example, a refundable tax credit administered by the IRD can be easily 
replaced by a cash subsidy from the ITF. 
 63 Wang, supra note 3, at 150; Robert Hamilton, Tax Incentives and Innovation: The 
Canadian Treatment of R&D, 19 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 233, 239-240 (1993). 
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In addition to institutional design considerations, another 
important consideration is company preference: do companies 
prefer to receive a tax benefit or an economically-equivalent non-tax 
subsidy?  Because of recent international tax reforms that are part of 
the OECD’s BEPS project, MNEs are better off if they receive cash 
subsidies and other non-tax subsidies instead of tax benefits, even if 
the subsidies and the tax benefits are economically equivalent.64  If 
an MNE receives income tax-free in Hong Kong as a result of a tax 
benefit, then there is a risk that other countries will impose a tax on 
that income.  This risk would be lower if MNEs paid tax on their 
income and received a cash subsidy equal to the tax paid.  As MNEs 
are better off if they receive non-tax subsidies, countries are likely 
to attract more MNE investment if they replace existing tax benefits 
with economically equivalent cash subsidies. 
C. Evaluation of R&D Tax Benefits in Hong Kong 
As discussed above, the Hong Kong government has 
recently enacted legislation providing a super deduction for R&D 
expenses.  As a deduction is only valuable for taxpayers that have 
taxable income, Wang proposes an additional refundable tax 
credit.65 
This section evaluates the newly adopted super deduction 
and the proposal for a refundable tax credit.  As part of this analysis, 
we should determine whether the characteristics of these subsidies 
are optimal, regardless of whether they are delivered as tax benefits 
or as cash subsidies.  Afterwards, we should determine whether 
subsidies with these specific characteristics should be structured as 
tax benefits or cash subsidies. 
A super deduction typically has the following 
characteristics: (i) the subsidy is calculated as a proportion of an 
                                                                                                               
 64 Noked, supra note 16. The international tax reforms under the OECD’s BEPS 
project create incentives for MNEs to prefer cash subsidies over tax benefits. An MNE’s 
country-by-country report (BEPS Action 13) would show higher taxes paid (and thus a 
higher effective tax rate) in the relevant jurisdiction if the MNE receives a subsidy instead 
of a tax benefit, and therefore the MNE would face a lower risk of being scrutinized by 
other tax authorities for income shifting to a low- or no-tax jurisdiction. Other BEPS 
reforms that create this incentive include stronger controlled foreign corporation rules 
(BEPS Action 3), greater scrutiny over harmful tax practices, and spontaneous exchange of 
tax rulings (BEPS Action 5). 
 65 Wang, supra note 3, at 166-67. 
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R&D expenditure made by the recipient; (ii) the subsidy usually 
involves matching;66  (iii) this benefit is typically nondiscretionary 
or minimally discretionary—any business that meets the 
requirements of the subsidy can claim the benefits, without a 
selection process;67  (iv) this benefit is granted once a year, during 
the year after incurring the qualifying R&D expense; (v) qualifying 
R&D expenses typically include expenses on labor and equipment 
for R&D; (vi) it is possible to limit the qualifying R&D expenses to 
incremental, additional expenses (i.e., above a certain threshold of 
“baseline” expenses) or to provide the subsidy to all R&D 
expenses;68  (vii) the benefits are typically open-ended—granted to 
any eligible business for its qualifying R&D expenses—without a 
budget constraint; and  (viii) the subsidy is capped at the tax liability 
of the recipient in the relevant year, and it is typically possible to 
carry over the subsidy to the following year(s); receiving it in the 
following year(s) is subject to the same cap of the tax liability in the 
future year(s). 
Refundable tax credit’s characteristics are generally similar 
to a super deduction with one difference—a refundable tax credit is 
not subject to a similar cap on the maximum subsidy amount, and if 
the refundable tax credit exceeds the tax liability the excess is paid 
by the government in cash.69 
It is unclear whether these characteristics optimize the 
spillovers from R&D in the most cost-effective manner.  The 
characteristics of a super deduction favor companies with taxable 
income in Hong Kong, and do not benefit foreign companies that do 
not have substantial taxable income in Hong Kong, neither do they 
                                                                                                               
 66 For example, assume that the tax rate is 15%, there is a super deduction of 200% 
and the subsidy recipient incurs a qualifying expense of 10. The recipient also has taxable 
income that exceeds 20. In this example, the super deduction would be of 20 (200% of 10) 
and the tax savings would be 3. In other words, the investor invests 10 and receives 3 from 
the government. Another way to describe it would be that the investor’s net investment is 7 
and the government’s investment is 3—this is the required matching ratio. 
 67 It is possible to add discretionary elements; however, as discussed above, 
administering a subsidy program by the tax authority creates a preference for 
nondiscretionary or minimally-discretionary rules. See text accompanying supra notes 50 
and 51. 
 68 For Wang’s discussion on incremental and volume-based tax credits, see Wang, 
supra note 3, at 166-67. Similar limits can be structured in super deductions. The new 
super deduction in Hong Kong is not limited to expenses above a certain threshold. 
 69 It is possible to set a cap on the maximum refundable tax credit as part of the 
design of the terms of this tax benefit. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
58 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
benefit start-up companies that typically have losses in their early 
stages of operation.  Most foreign companies, including MNEs, do 
not have substantial taxable income in Hong Kong, and even if they 
conduct R&D in Hong Kong such activity will not result in a high 
tax liability in Hong Kong.70  Therefore, these tax benefits are 
unlikely to result in a significant increase in foreign investment in 
R&D in Hong Kong.  Foreign companies can potentially benefit 
from the super deduction to offset their income from IP if they 
register in Hong Kong the IP that they developed there, and if such 
IP generates income.  However, it is questionable if companies 
(especially MNEs) would find this option attractive considering the 
BEPS international tax reforms, which create incentives to avoid 
locating IP and receiving tax-free income from royalties in a low tax 
jurisdiction such as Hong Kong.  In addition, these tax benefits are 
unlikely to support start-ups that typically generate losses at their 
early stages and are subject to significant credit constraints.71 
                                                                                                               
 70 A typical setup of an R&D center setup is described by the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 111-16 (2017): 
“Company A of an MNE group agrees with company B of the same MNE group to carry 
out contract research for company B. All risks related to the research are assumed by 
company B. This company also owns all the intangibles developed through the research 
and therefore has also the profit chances resulting from the research.” According to the 
OECD, this is a typical setup for applying the cost-plus method, according to which the 
taxable income equals the R&D center’s expenses plus a small profit margin, usually 
calculated as a percentage of the expenses. This way the R&D center is typically taxed 
only on a small and arbitrary profit, which may be smaller than the actual contribution of 
the R&D activities to the MNE’s overall profits. The IP developed by the R&D center 
under this arrangement is typically registered in another jurisdiction, so Hong Kong does 
not tax the proceeds of such IP. In addition, investors who make capital investments in 
start-ups, with no trading intent, are not subject to tax in Hong Kong on their capital gains 
when the start-up is sold or issued to the public. Therefore, MNEs, venture capital funds, 
angel investors and other investors that all typically hold their investments in start-ups for a 
few years, are not taxed on their gains. In the case of a loss, the investors cannot offset 
capital losses from failing investments against taxable income from other sources in Hong 
Kong. In addition, Hong Kong does not impose withholding on dividend payments to 
foreign investors. Therefore most foreign companies, including tech MNEs, who invest in 
R&D in Hong Kong do not have substantial tax exposure in Hong Kong. 
 71 Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms, 69 
TAX L. REV. 357, 358 (2016) (“We suggest that, under reasonable assumptions for 
endowment, burn rate, and probability of success over time, a new start-up would 
rationally decide not to make a material investment in tax planning to eliminate income tax 
on any future profits. Later in a firm’s life, when it has a larger endowment and a higher 
probability of success, the analysis shifts and there is a greater incentive to invest in tax 
planning. Our argument that income tax breaks for entrepreneurship or innovation should 
not be expected to motivate the desired behavior at new start-up firms contrasts with 
frequent and broad recommendations for the adoption of such tax breaks”). 
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Refundable tax credits, which are similar to a cash subsidy 
with a matching requirement, would be available to companies with 
no taxable income in Hong Kong, but the costs of such a scheme 
might be significantly higher.  These costs would include larger 
enforcement costs, and costs of tax fraud because companies would 
have a stronger incentive to engage in re-labeling and false 
reporting as they can receive a cash grant from the government on a 
nondiscretionary basis by claiming expenses as R&D expenses. 
In addition, the empirical evidence on the impact of the 
R&D tax credits and super deductions raises concerns about 
whether these tax subsidies are cost-effective.  After reviewing the 
empirical evidence on R&D tax incentives, Graetz and Doud 
concluded that the empirical evidence suggests that “R&D tax 
incentives may increase the amount of R&D and the number of 
R&D employees but their cost-effectiveness is less certain than their 
advocates claim . . . .  The efficacy of R&D incentives often turns 
on their structure, size, and scope. Whether current incentives are 
cost-effective . . .  remains uncertain.”72  Another study on R&D tax 
incentives stated that “[s]tudies that are more rigorous find that one 
euro of foregone tax revenue on R&D tax credits raises expenditure 
on R&D by less than one euro.73  In the light of the empirical 
evidence and the considerations discussed above, it is questionable 
whether the characteristics of super deductions and tax credits are 
optimal. 
In addition to these general considerations, the Hong Kong 
government should adopt a policy that addresses the problems and 
challenges that are specific to Hong Kong.  To determine the 
characteristics of the optimal R&D subsidy, the Hong Kong 
government should first discover why private investment in R&D in 
Hong Kong is relatively low, and the steps that they can take to 
increase local and foreign investment in Hong Kong’s high-tech 
sector.74  It is unclear whether such an analysis was conducted prior 
to passing the legislation granting a super deduction. 
                                                                                                               
 72 Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
347, 395-401 (2013). 
 73 CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, supra note 13. 
 74 It is possible that one of Hong Kong’s main challenges when developing the high-
tech sector is a shortage of engineering talent. See section II.D below for alternative 
subsidies which focus on developing the local talent pool. 
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Moreover, even if a super deduction or a tax credit has the 
characteristics of an optimal subsidy for R&D in Hong Kong, it 
would be more efficient to structure such subsidy as a cash subsidy 
administered by a specialized agency, as discussed in section B 
above.  The advantages of structuring such a subsidy as a tax benefit 
administered by the IRD are unclear.  It is possible to design a 
subsidy economically equivalent to a super deduction by limiting 
the maximum annual subsidy to the annual tax liability of the 
relevant recipient and allowing a carry-forward of the amount above 
that cap to future years. A refundable tax credit can be structured as 
a cash subsidy with a matching requirement.  As discussed above, 
even where the subsidy is nondiscretionary, administering it by a 
specialized agency still has advantages of expertise (such as the 
expertise to determine the claims that are for real R&D expenses), 
lower coordination costs with other subsidy schemes, a greater 
ability to make changes in the subsidy, and a greater ability to 
operate within a budget.  It is unclear whether the compliance and 
administrative costs would be different if a subsidy were 
administered by the IRD or by a specialized agency.  In addition, as 
MNEs have reasons to prefer subsidies over tax benefits because of 
BEPS, Hong Kong may be able to attract more MNE investment if 
it adopts cash subsidies instead of economically-equivalent tax 
benefits. 
To conclude, the characteristics of super deductions and tax 
credits for R&D expenses are unlikely to be optimal, and even if 
they were, economically-equivalent cash subsidies administered by 
a specialized agency are likely to be superior to them. 
The Hong Kong government should monitor the impact of 
the new super deduction and assess after a period of time whether 
this tax benefit results in a substantial increase in the R&D 
investment in Hong Kong.  Analysts should be wary of companies 
re-labeling various expenses as R&D expenses, a documented 
phenomenon in other countries that grant tax benefits for R&D 
expenses.  This might create a false impression that the private 
investment in R&D is growing while this reported growth might be 
explained, at least in part, as re-labeling of non-R&D expenses as 
R&D expenditures.  This Article predicts that the new super 
deduction is unlikely either to attract substantial foreign investment 
in domestic R&D or to boost the growth of start-ups in Hong Kong.  
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More data, which will become available over time, is needed to 
assess whether this prediction is correct. 
D. Alternative Policies 
This section considers alternative subsidies that may be 
superior to super deductions, tax credits, and economically-
equivalent cash subsidies.  In general, investment in human capital 
likely generates much of the domestic spillovers associated with 
R&D.75  If the Hong Kong government could incentivize companies 
to provide more training and work experience to employees in R&D 
positions, then this would likely result in large positive spillovers.  
Some countries provide cash subsidies or tax benefits for investment 
in human capital and for the payment of salaries to R&D 
employees.76  If the largest spillovers from investment in human 
capital are generated in each employee’s first few years of R&D 
employment, it is possible to limit the subsidy to that period by 
granting a subsidy to companies that hire university graduates for 
their first R&D jobs.77  The ITF already provides a subsidy for 
internship programs.78  It is possible to create another subsidy 
scheme for R&D employees. In addition, attracting a handful of 
tech MNEs could have a significant impact on the local economy’s 
growth because these MNEs can train a substantial number of local 
                                                                                                               
 75 Noked, supra note 6, at 145. This is because it increases employment in high 
paying jobs; it improves human capital by providing training and experience, which can 
create value even after the employees leave the company that trained them; it has a positive 
impact on tax revenues collected based on both the workers’ personal income and their 
consumption. 
 76 Some European countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary, have 
enacted employment tax benefits for employing R&D workers, which include tax credits 
for R&D salary costs, payroll tax deduction, and exemption for withholding tax on salaries 
to researchers. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 72, at 354. In addition, Israel offers 
employment grants, calculated as a percentage of the employees’ salaries, to foreign 
companies that open R&D centers in specific areas in Israel, and to companies that hire 
certain employees. R&D Centers: Investment Models in Israel, at 28-29,  
http://investinisrael.gov.il/HowWeHelp/downloads/R_D.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBB8-J9P7] 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018) . 
 77 Noked, supra note 6, at 145. During these early years of professional development, 
the company has to invest in training the worker to increase her skills and productivity. 
After gaining valuable experience, the worker might be more attractive to other companies 
that would hire her without any subsidy. Alternatively, she might be able to start her own 
company. 
 78 ITF, http://www.itf.gov.hk/l-eng/GSP-IP.asp [https://perma.cc/5DKH-TU47] (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
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employees and contribute to the development of a specialized hub.  
This explains why some governments compete over MNE 
investments and offer MNEs direct grants, land-use rights, tax 
benefits, and other incentives.79  The Hong Kong government can 
negotiate with selected MNEs and offer them benefits in exchange 
for meeting certain employment targets. 
The existing subsidy schemes provided by the ITF should be 
evaluated.  It is possible that the budgets of some existing schemes 
should be increased.  It is also possible that the existing programs do 
not live up to their full potential and could be improved by reducing 
bureaucracy, providing more guidance to applicants, increasing 
transparency, simplifying the application process, and expediting 
the review process of applications. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Article stresses the importance of choosing the most 
cost-effective instrument to support the development of Hong 
Kong’s high-tech industry.  The Hong Kong government should 
analyze the challenges and problems of Hong Kong’s high-tech 
sector and decide the steps it can take to support its growth.  After 
the necessary analysis has been conducted, the government should 
develop its R&D policy with a comprehensive approach that does 
not divide the development of policies between separate parts of the 
government based on the type of instrument. 
The analysis in this Article suggests that a cash subsidy 
provided by a specialized agency such as the ITF would likely be 
superior to providing a super deduction through the tax system, even 
if the cash subsidy and the tax benefit are economically equivalent.  
The tax policy literature and the empirical evidence raise serious 
doubts about whether a super deduction would be the optimal 
measure for increasing R&D investment.  Instead of foregoing tax 
revenues to fund a super deduction, the Hong Kong government 
should consider using these resources to fund other, more cost-
effective subsidies.  It should consider subsidies that target 
investment in human capital and attract selected MNEs, and it 
should also consider improving the existing subsidy schemes. 
                                                                                                               
 79 Noked, supra note 6, at 154. 
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